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1. Introduction
How is status mobility possible? Traditional sociological 
theories of status (e.g. Berger et al., 1974; Cook and Emerson, 
1978; Gould, 2002) generally characterize mobility as the ex-
ception to the rule, citing cumulative advantage, or what Mer-
ton (1968) famously referred to as the “Matthew Effect”, as the 
cause of enduring status inequalities (for a recent example see 
Rossman et al., 2010).1 “Strict” cumulative advantage models 
can take a variety of functional forms (see DiPrete and Eirich, 
2006 for a review) but generally describe the benefits, or re-
turns, to holding a privileged position: where individuals with 
initial advantages—whether by virtue of their own talents or 
serendipity—garner subsequent advantages, and are thus un-
likely to lose status.2 Low status actors, meanwhile, are un-
likely to gain it. In some contexts, high status actors are also 
in position to alter the “rules of the game” in their favor, fur-
ther cementing the advantage of the upper echelon (Bour-
dieu, 2004). High status actors are especially advantaged when 
merit is difficult to distinguish from status, such as in inter-
personal status hierarchies. Cumulative advantage generates a 
rigid hierarchy in such settings, where mobility is extremely 
unlikely, yet enduring in the rare event it does occur.
Here we reverse these propositions, arguing that social mo-
bility in interpersonal hierarchies is actually quite common, 
but not often lasting. Moves up or down the status hierarchy 
are frequent, but fleeting, as the past strongly drags the mo-
bile back to their original positions. Our model thus arrives 
at the same long-term pattern of stratification as the strict cu-
mulative advantage model—where sustained mobility is un-
likely—but through very different means. In contrast to cumu-
lative advantage models, which predict growing inequality, or 
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This paper develops a theory of interpersonal status hierarchies that builds on and challenges traditional models of cumula-
tive advantage. Cumulative advantage models predict stability in interpersonal status hierarchies, where status is defined by 
asymmetries in social relationships. According to strict cumulative advantage, initial status differences are exaggerated over 
time, making upward or downward mobility unlikely. We argue that interpersonal status hierarchies are instead quite fluid, 
with individuals regularly moving up or down the hierarchy. Individual status gains do not, however, disrupt the status or-
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ties are stable and the expectations for reciprocity are low. We test our model using longitudinal data on adolescents, finding 
strong support for the theory. We end the paper with a reflexive discussion about measurement error, hypothesis testing, and 
“messy” longitudinal network data.
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1. The Matthew Effect refers to high status individuals receiving more credit or prestige than their accomplishments would otherwise warrant, or 
as Merton (1968, p. 58) put it, “accruing greater increments of recognition for particular scientific contributions to scientists of considerable repute 
and the withholding of such recognition from scientists who have not yet made their mark.” For empirical examples outside of the scientific do-
main, Rossman et al. (2010) find that high status film actors are more likely to find subsequent success, and Martin (2009) shows that youth dom-
inance hierarchies quickly become fixed, and that dominant youths are challenged even less often than would be expected.
2. DiPrete and Eirich (2006) show that the “Blau-Duncan” form of cumulative advantage, which attempts to explain group-level inequality through 
direct and indirect effects, does not necessarily lead to growing inequality over time—though in practice, most empirical applications seem to find 
growing inequality. Because our focus is on individual actors, unless stated otherwise, we focus on “strict” cumulative advantage mechanisms.
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at minimum a stable status ranking, our actors make fleeting 
moves up and down the hierarchy before returning to their 
original positions. The long-term solidity of most status hier-
archies belies, in our view, a great deal of movement between 
time points, and is achieved only through the stabilizing influ-
ence of the past. Status hierarchies are thus fluid rather than 
fixed, but they are also slippery.
Some status hierarchies are less slippery than others, how-
ever, providing the upwardly mobile with sufficient traction 
to maintain their status gains. Rather than treat sustained mo-
bility as an anomaly, we systematically extend our theory to 
the contextual level, explaining why sustained mobility hap-
pens in some settings but not in others. We identify two prop-
erties of networks that facilitate lasting mobility: sustained 
mobility is possible in networks where ties, once made, tend 
to endure and where the expectations for reciprocity are low. 
In such settings, the upwardly mobile are unfettered from the 
past, free to enjoy their newly won status.
We begin the paper by discussing the centrality of cumu-
lative advantage in sociological theory. We then move to our 
own theory and explain why status hierarchies are often char-
acterized by movement without sustained mobility. We also 
explain why the “drag” of the past is weak, and thus sustained 
mobility possible, in some, but not most, contexts. We test our 
theory using longitudinal data on adolescents, showing in 
multiple contexts that the past matters, dragging aspiring so-
cial climbers back to their original positions.
Unlike most studies of network dynamics, we test our the-
ory while recognizing the messy nature of longitudinal network 
data. Any study that is dependent on the reporting of partic-
ular ties to particular people is subject to sources of measure-
ment error: individuals may report ties inaccurately or incon-
sistently, making it difficult to distinguish between true change 
and change to due error. We develop a simulation procedure 
to test the validity of our results. We believe this is a useful ex-
ercise. In our case, we can be confident that the results are real, 
but this may not be true of all studies, and one can only be sure 
by taking the problem of measurement error seriously.
2. Theory
2.1. Status as asymmetry
To describe the process of status change we must first de-
fine status. There are many different conceptualizations (see 
Martin, 2009 for a review), but most center on the idea that 
high status people are socially desirable and receive deference 
(Gould, 2002; Martin, 2009 ; Rossman et al., 2010). Gould oper-
ationalizes status in network terms, where high status individ-
uals receive many nominations (or “gestures of approval” p. 
1147). Research in both the status characteristics/expectations 
states (e.g. Cohen and Roper, 1972; Ridgeway, 1978; Ridge-
way, 1982) and social network traditions (Bukowski and New-
comb, 1984; Moody, 1999; Moody et al., 2011; Bothner et al., 
2010a; Bothner et al., 2010b) have similarly defined status as 
a function of social relationships—higher status actors receive 
more friendship nominations (relative to lower status actors), 
give advice that is followed, talk more in meetings, and so on.
Asymmetric relationships are particularly useful markers 
of status as they imply both social desirability and deference. 
Receiving a nomination without the expectation of reciproc-
ity establishes interpersonal leverage, and we are unlikely to 
see asymmetries favor lightly regarded individuals. Higher 
status individuals receive many nominations relative to their 
outdegree—in other words, ego is high status if the demand 
for ego’s time/attention/friendship is much greater than ego’s 
rate of reciprocity. Symmetric relationships are of great value 
(e.g. because they provide social support, facilitate socializa-
tion, etc.), but they establish status distinctions, or signals of 
deference, to a lesser extent than asymmetric nominations. An 
individual thus moves up the status hierarchy by gaining so-
cial leverage, or distinctions, over a large number of people. 3 
The questions are how often upwardly mobility happens and 
how often the upwardly mobile maintain their status gains. 
Below, we contrast our own answers to these questions with 
those based on classic cumulative advantage. Though the an-
swers are quite different, the overall outcome—long-term sta-
bility of status hierarchies—is often the same.
2.2. Cumulative advantage and its limits
Merton’s (1968) study of scientific careers spurred initial 
interest in cumulative advantage processes, where initial ad-
vantages—created by talent or chance—lead to subsequent 
advantages, thus increasing the gap between the top and the 
bottom over time.4 Cumulative advantage ideas were subse-
quently formalized (Zuckerman and Merton, 1971; Cole and 
Cole, 1973; Allison et al., 1982) and applied widely as an expla-
nation for persistent or growing inequality in political, organi-
zational, educational, economic, and even cultural (Salganik et 
al., 2006) realms (see DiPrete and Eirich, 2006; Bothner et al., 
2010a; Bothner et al., 2010b).
“Strict” cumulative advantage models assume that future 
accumulation depends on the current level of accumulation.5 
In the strongest form (for growing inequality), the rate of re-
turn itself varies by the level of current accumulation; thus, the 
wealthy not only have more money to invest, and thus higher 
absolute returns, they also receive better interest rates. In sci-
entific settings, more talented or luckier scientists enjoy ever 
increasing advantages over their less talented or unlucky col-
leagues: even when their contributions are equivalent, they are 
evaluated in light of past accomplishments (DiPrete and Eirich, 
2006). Strict cumulative advantage also lies at the root of pref-
erential attachment models, where new entries into a network 
preferentially choose people with many nominations (Barabási 
and Albert, 1999; Newman, 2001; Albert and Barabási, 2002).
Cumulative advantage will operate strongly when projec-
tions of future quality or merit are driven by perceptions of cur-
rent quality – thus scientists with prestigious publications win 
grants and websites with many links receive more visibility. 
When quality is difficult to discern, observers must rely on cur-
rent perception as a benchmark, a measure that will dispropor-
tionably reward people in advantaged positions. Thus, current 
status directly leads to higher future status. Yet even in a more 
“objective” world, individuals receive education, training, and 
resources based on their past performance. These resources lead 
to an increase in productivity, amplifying the initial advantage 
in perceived quality (Merton, 1988). These feedback loops make 
it possible for small initial differences between individuals to 
grow into very large differences in outcomes.
3. Our measure also differs from a patronage based definition, where actors in fragile positions are likely to lose status precipitously if one or more 
of their patrons loses status or stops their endorsement (Bothner et al., 2010a and Bothner et al., 2010b). Ours can be viewed as a more “demo-
cratic” conception: one cannot achieve high status by receiving many votes from a few people, but must instead receive single vote from a large 
number of people.
4. We thus assume that the cumulative advantage process is “positive” so that the parameter describing the relationship between past and current 
accumulation is greater than 0. The full range of past events, or “shocks”, thus affects the current level of accumulation. See Footnote 2 in DiPrete 
and Eirich (2006) for more details.
5. We ignore, for space considerations, simple cumulative advantage models which specify a time dependence but no explicit relationship between 
future and current accumulation.
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Though they are central to many theories of inequality, rig-
orous longitudinal tests of cumulative advantage are “more 
the exception than the rule” (DiPrete and Eirich, 2006, p. 272). 
Instead, the mere presence of inequality in the cross section is 
sometimes taken as evidence of cumulative advantage, despite 
the possibility of alternative explanations, as we outline below. 
For example, extremely unequal “superstar” markets are gener-
ated when rewards are based on relative, not absolute, perfor-
mance (Rosen, 1981; Frank and Cook, 1995), but such inequal-
ity does not necessarily imply a cumulative advantage process.
Many studies have, however, recognized the subtlety (and 
variety) of cumulative advantage mechanisms, noting that 
few settings devolve into the winner-take-all monopolies pre-
dicted by the simplest version of the theory (Merton, 1968). In-
stead, factors such as redistributive policies (Merton, 1968), in-
complete information (Collins, 2000), normative constraints 
(Luhmann, 1987), and the diffusion of status from elites to 
their associates (Bothner et al., 2010a; Bothner et al., 2010b) all 
prevent winner-take-all outcomes.
In the case of interpersonal status hierarchies, Gould (2002) 
offers a clear explanation for the asymptotic growth in inequal-
ity, arguing that actors must balance the desire for high status 
alters against the desire for reciprocity (Gould, 2002). If people 
cared little for reciprocity, they would simply send ties to those 
who received the most ties, eventually creating a “star” net-
work, where one actor receives all ties. Thus, for Gould, it is de-
sire for reciprocity alone that prevents the hierarchy from turn-
ing into a winner-take-all system of maximum inequality.
In short, constrained cumulative advantage models expect 
no winner-take-all systems but still predict growing inequali-
ties and long run stability in the status hierarchy. There is little 
room for mobility in such a model unless there are clear mea-
sures of exogenous quality distinct from status. The rare up-
ward moves that do occur should be lasting, however, as the 
upwardly mobile take advantage of their positions to consol-
idate their gains.
We argue that a strict cumulative advantage model is a use-
ful, but ultimately incomplete, way to approach status mobility: 
incomplete, as the model cannot naturally account for move-
ment in a system; useful, as the basic elements of the model can 
be refashioned to explain the causes and consequences of sta-
tus mobility. We begin by describing the micro dynamics of sta-
tus change, explaining why there are “Mark Effects”, where ini-
tial gains in status are made by previous losers, not winners, of 
status contests. We then describe why this initial mobility is of-
ten fleeting. We frame our discussion in terms of upward mo-
bility, but we note that any explanation of upward mobility has 
reverse implications for downward mobility.
2.3. Mark effects and the drag of the past in the reproduction 
of status hierarchies
Individuals in our model often gain and lose status from 
period to period (although the moves are generally tempo-
rary). Status movement is possible, in part, because tie for-
mation and dissolution are stochastic processes driven by 
multiple considerations, only one of which is status. The de-
sire for novelty, the need for companionship, and the bitter-
ness over past disputes may lead people to make friends with 
the ‘wrong’ people and abandon ties to the ‘right’ ones. Thus, 
a certain amount of dynamism inheres in interpersonal hierar-
chies, and some friendship choices may seem illogical from a 
status perspective (e.g. befriending an isolate).
Status considerations are, of course, still important for rela-
tionship decisions, and we incorporate the two conflicting de-
mands in Gould’s (2002) model into our own explanation of 
status mobility: (a) the desire for reciprocity and (b) the de-
sire for high status alters. In Gould’s model, the desire for rec-
iprocity prevents the cumulative advantage process from de-
volving into a winner-take-all hierarchy. On one extreme, if 
the desire for reciprocity greatly outweighs the desire for high 
status alters, then ties are likely to be withdrawn if they are 
not reciprocated, resulting in less status differentiation and 
greater equality.6 In these compressed settings where rela-
tively few ties differentiate the top from the bottom, changes 
in ties—which occur for many reasons besides status consid-
erations, including conflict, drifts, changed activities, and new 
romances and friendships—have more dramatic effects on sta-
tus. Status effects could, in contrast, be quite strong. Despite 
the drive toward reciprocity (Hallinan, 1978; Lubbers and Sni-
jders, 2007), many adolescent ties are asymmetric. For exam-
ple, in the widely-used Add Health study, the overall reciproc-
ity rate is just 37% (Ueno, 2005).7 If there is any desire for high 
status alters, then they should be more likely than low status 
actors to gain and maintain asymmetric ties over time (as they 
already receive the esteem of their peers – Gould, 2002).8
The question is whether the reciprocity demands are high 
enough to compress the hierarchy and make shifts in the sta-
tus order possible. There are several reasons to believe that rec-
iprocity demands outweigh the desire for high status alters in 
interpersonal status hierarchies; not the least of which is that 
many relationships—especially friendship—are premised on 
companionship and mutual positive affect. If A tolerates dra-
matic asymmetry in her personal relationship with B, B is more 
likely to carelessly neglect and possibly abuse A’s feelings. 
More to the point of status, A’s tolerance signals her lower so-
cial rank to others. If, however, A breaks the connection, the so-
cial distinction becomes less clear. Furthermore, such break-
ups are not easy for high status actors to prevent. Since status 
is based on positive affect (which cannot be coerced), they have 
few enforcement mechanisms at their disposal. These factors 
imply a general tendency for unreciprocated ties to be with-
drawn or to become mutual, consistent with empirical research 
(Doreian et al., 1996; Schaefer et al., 2010).
We thus have a system where higher status actors have a 
hard time maintaining their asymmetric nominations. They 
have many ties to juggle and reciprocity outweighs the sta-
tus effects.9 Additionally, if the preference for high status al-
ters is relatively weak, high status actors’ advantage in gaining 
new ties will not fully compensate for their losses. Meanwhile, 
those with lower status are able to gain new ties, albeit at a 
lower rate, without losing many (since they can invest heavily 
6. One might argue, akin to the parable about the one-eyed king in the land of the blind, that a network with one asymmetric tie is less equal than 
one with many (since in the former, one person will receive 100% of the asymmetric ties). However, we suggest that for inequality to be mean-
ingful, the absolute differences between the highest status person and the lowest must be substantial.
7. Even for “best” friend nominations of the same gender, reciprocity is less than 50% (Strauss and Pollack, 2003). Other studies have found that 
between one-fifth and one-third of adolescents have no reciprocated friendships and that the majority of friendship nominations are unrecipro-
cated (Parker and Asher, 1993, Cascairo et al., 1999 and Vitaro et al., 2000). Most rates are, however, subject to fixed degree, potentially leading 
to undercounts of reciprocity.
8. Higher status people may also be incapable of fully reciprocating every social offer they receive due to limited time and resources (Mayhew, 
1980 and Roberts et al., 2009).
9. This is true even if they have lower probabilities of tie loss. For example, assume an upper status person has 6 nominations and a .2 probability 
of losing a given tie over time. Also assume that there is a lower status person with 2 ties and a .3 probability of losing a given tie. Thus the high 
status person has an advantage in keeping ties over time. On average, the high status person loses 1.2 ties while the low status person loses .6 
ties, meaning the two converge over time despite the advantage of the high status person. The high status person keeps .8 of their ties while the 
low status person keeps .7 of their ties over time.
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in their few ties). Thus, rather than adding increasingly more 
ties over time, as in preferential attachment models, we ex-
pect people with higher status to lose status in subsequent time 
points, both in relative and absolute terms. 10
The model does not directly predict the cycles of status 
found in adolescent ethnographies (Eder, 1985; Kinney, 1993), 
but the loss of status at the top does imply that mobility is pos-
sible: the more the status hierarchy is compressed, the more 
likely that idiosyncratic changes will alter the status rankings. 
The shrinking inequality and status mobility predicted by our 
model are difficult to reconcile, however, with the widespread 
perception that social status is relatively stable and mobility 
the exception (Bukowski and Newcomb, 1984; Eder and Kin-
ney, 1995). We suggest that movements up and down the hier-
archy are possible but fleeting as the drag of the past is severe, 
effectively moving the mobile back toward their previous po-
sition. Those below their long run status position are likely to 
enjoy a net gain in ties, while those above it are likely to ex-
perience a net loss, producing a general regression toward in-
dividual equilibrium points. Our view is therefore similar to 
that of Franzoi et al. (1994) who describe status trajectories as 
having “movement yet nonmovement” and we find this lan-
guage and interpretation quite appealing. Substantial individ-
ual-level movement (and even types of trajectories, Moody et 
al., 2011) is compatible with long-term stability of the status 
hierarchy if movers tend to revert to prior positions.
Much of our expectations regarding the past are based on 
a simple proposition that new ties are less stable than old ties. 
Here, stability refers to the likelihood of an existing tie dissolv-
ing, not the likelihood of new ties forming. Intuitively, new 
relationships involve a great deal of uncertainty: two people 
may become friends without knowing if this is a good pairing. 
Empirical research has shown that new ties are less stable than 
old, more established relationships (Hallinan and Williams, 
1987; Burt, 2000). If new ties are more fragile than old ones, 
the upwardly mobile should be more likely to drop in status 
in subsequent periods: for their status rests disproportionately 
on new ties. By contrast, individuals with stable status, as well 
as the downwardly mobile, are more likely to retain status in 
subsequent periods (as they rely less on new ties).
The upwardly mobile also lose ties because the expecta-
tions of reciprocity are tied up in the certainty of the receiver’s 
status: less certainty about the upwardly mobile’s high status 
position results in higher expectations of reciprocity and, con-
sequently, less stable nominations. Essentially, if the sender 
cannot be sure the receiver is going to remain high status, then 
she is less likely to tolerate asymmetry (as asymmetries are not 
tolerated from status inferiors or equals). The higher expecta-
tions of reciprocity also make it difficult to gain ties. The up-
wardly mobile face greater demands and must spend more 
time and energy maintaining their current relationships.11 This 
leaves less time and energy for interacting with new sets of 
people, which could, potentially, have led to future nomina-
tions. The downwardly mobile will, in contrast, find it easier 
to add ties relative to status peers and may regain their lost 
position (as they have higher past status and thus lower ex-
pectations of reciprocity than status peers).
Our model is thus comprised of two countervailing tenden-
cies. Lower status individuals often gain status in subsequent 
time periods, but find it difficult to maintain their newfound 
status, as they gain fewer ties and lose more ties over time. If 
the drag of the past (time 1) is strong relative to the effect of 
present status (time 2), a past reputation of high status is likely 
to cushion, or possibly reverse, the predicted fall of high sta-
tus actors, while those of lowly origins are likely to fall farther 
than their consistently high status peers. A picture of stability 
thus emerges in the face of period to period movement, where 
the stratification order is maintained and the initially high sta-
tus win in the long run.
2.4. Contextual variation
We have so far presented a model where initial mobility 
is diminished or reversed by the effect of the past, rendering 
status gains fleeting and lasting mobility unlikely. Our model 
thus arrives at the same long run pattern of inequality as the 
strict (constrained) cumulative advantage models, although by 
very different means. Unlike cumulative advantage models, 
however, we describe how and, more importantly, where, last-
ing mobility is possible. Specifically, we argue that the effect of 
the past, and thus the possibility of lasting mobility, depends 
crucially on network stability and reciprocity, the macro re-
alizations of our micro mechanisms (Smith, 2012). We begin 
with a discussion of tie stability and then move to reciprocity.
We have argued that upwardly mobile people rely heav-
ily on new ties and that new ties are less stable than more es-
tablished relationships, making it difficult to maintain status 
gains. We suggest, however, that the differences between old 
and new ties will be less consequential when ties, in general, are 
more stable. The stability of new and old ties should converge 
(or be closer) in stable settings as the forces supporting stabil-
ity make new ties effectively old in a shorter amount of time.12 
The upwardly mobile are then more likely to hold on to their 
status when ties are more stable: for they are penalized less for 
their reliance on newer ties. Formally, we define tie stability as 
the proportion of ties (both symmetric and asymmetric) that last 
from one period to next. The expected loss in status (T2 to T3) 
that follows a status gain (T1 to T2) should decrease as the sta-
bility of ties in the network increases (given status at T2).13
Past position is less important in stable settings, but should, 
in contrast, matter more in contexts with higher reciprocity. Fol-
lowing Gould (2002), we assume a tradeoff exists between re-
ciprocation and nominating a high status alter. If reciprocity is 
expected and not received, the differentials in status between 
sender and receiver must be higher to balance the relationship. 
Reciprocity here serves as a proxy for the level of asymmetry 
tolerated in relationships. The effect of receiver status on asym-
metric tie stability and formation is thus larger in higher reci-
procity settings (as the level of tolerated asymmetry is lower). 
Upwardly mobile people will have a more difficult time main-
taining their social rise in higher reciprocity settings. They have 
less certain status, and higher reciprocity expectations, than 
consistently high status people and status matters more for 
keeping and gaining asymmetric nominations.14 Thus past posi-
tion will matter more where reciprocity rates are higher.
We offer a summary of our main expectations before em-
pirically testing our theory of status change, arguing that: 
(a) higher status people have a lower likelihood of losing 
10. Of course, it is not possible for the highest status person in a network to gain status in relative terms, and therefore they have nowhere to go but 
down. However, cumulative advantage models suggest that such people should continue to make absolute status gains, and so should have an 
increasingly easy time maintaining their position at the top. Thus, it is meaningful when they fail to do so.
11. See a similar idea in the work on negative social capital (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993).
12. For example, structured, repetitive interaction may make all ties more stable while simultaneously making new ties old ties faster: the higher rate, 
or frequency, of contact means new ties spend less time in the uncertain phase of development, when breaking off the relationship is more likely.
13. This is not tautological since network stability refers to the network average. It is possible for new ties to be less stable than old ones even in 
highly stable networks, just as it is possible that new ties will be equally stable as old ties in low tie stability settings.
14. The downwardly mobile will, in contrast, find it easier to regain their lost position: they face lower expectations of reciprocity and there is room 
in the hierarchy to move up (as the upwardly mobile are losing status).
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ties and higher likelihood of gaining ties, but that the bene-
fits of status are overwhelmed by the demand for reciprocity; 
and (b) for this reason, higher status actors often suffer status 
losses, rather than gains; (c) that the higher the gain in status 
between T1 and T2, the lower status at T3, given status at T2; 
(d), that the underlying mechanisms structuring this drag are 
differential tie stability and expectations of reciprocity; and 
more specifically, (e), that the past drags more strongly on 
current transitions when tie stability is lower and reciproc-
ity is higher.
3. Data and methods
Our longitudinal, multilevel network data come from the 
Context of Adolescent Substance Use Study (see Ennett et al., 
2006; Ennett et al., 2008). The study was originally commis-
sioned to study adolescent networks, social context and sub-
stance use, although we are primarily interested in the net-
work variables. The survey included three school districts in 
North Carolina and began in the spring of 2002. A saturated 
sample of students answered surveys every sixth month un-
til the spring of 2004 (for most schools).15 There are 5 waves 
of full data but we only make use of the first three to avoid 
boundary problems associated with the transition from mid-
dle school to high school. The network nominations were re-
stricted to grades while students were in middle school (co-
inciding with the first three waves of data) but expanded to 
the entire school upon entry to high school (waves 4 and 5). 
The networks are thus not directly comparable across the 
five waves and we use the first three to maintain consistent 
boundaries.
The initial cohorts were in sixth, seventh and eighth grade. 
The sample includes about an equal number of males and fe-
males and an equal number of whites and non-whites (52% 
white, 37% black, 4% Hispanic, 7% other). The data are not 
representative of the population of adolescents, but the study 
has the advantages of being relatively large (N = 4244 in 
wave I) and including longitudinal network data over a siz-
able number of settings and time points. Our dataset includes 
24 separate contexts of varying size and network properties, 
where each “context” corresponds to a unique grade/school 
combination. 16 The average size of the grades/schools is 251, 
with a minimum of 44 and a maximum of 511.
4. Measures
4.1. Dependent variable
We construct our status measure from friendship nomina-
tion data. Students were asked to nominate up to five friends 
from a complete student roster. Using that network informa-
tion, we measure status as the rate of indegree (or nomina-
tions) of an individual, net of their outdegree and the expected 
rate of reciprocity in that network. This captures how many 
nominations an individual receives conditioned on the num-
ber of (expected) reciprocated relationships.
We first estimate a p1 model for each network (Holland and 
Leinhardt, 1981). The model predicts a tie as a function of vol-
ume (edges), reciprocity (mutuality), and outdegree (sender), 
indegree (receiver) effects for each individual. There is one re-
ceiver and sender term for each individual in the network. We 
then take the coefficients on the receiver effects as the measure 
of status. Formally:
where X is a random network on n nodes; x is the observed 
network; θ, β, α, ρ capture effects for edges, out-degree, in-de-
gree and reciprocity respectively; and κ(θ, β, α, ρ) is the nor-
malizing constant.
The basic idea is to estimate indegree conditioned on out-
degree, or how often they nominate others, as well as the rate 
of reciprocity in the network. Indegree forms the base of the 
measure but this is discounted by the expected number of re-
ciprocated ties. Higher status individuals will receive many 
nominations relative to the number given out, and are thus 
able to form relationships even if they do not reciprocate. 
Someone who is nominated 4 times and gives out 1 tie has 
higher status than someone who receives 4 nominations and 
gives out 3 ties. Someone with 4 nominations and 3 out-going 
ties will still have higher status than someone with 0 or 1 nom-
inations and low outdegree (for example).
As an alternative, we could use the simple counts of asym-
metric nominations as the measure of status. Here, we would 
determine if each nomination per person is asymmetric, where 
the focal respondent does not return a received nomination. 
We would then sum up the number of asymmetric nomina-
tions for every respondent. The results are very similar be-
tween the model based and count based measures of status, 
but there are substantive reasons to use the model based ap-
proach. First, the count approach equates an isolate with no 
ties and someone with 5 symmetric nominations and no asym-
metric nominations. This is a rather harsh penalty for recipro-
cation as it affords no status value to symmetric ties. Symmet-
ric ties do, however, serve as a metric of social desirability. We 
do not believe that the isolate and the person with 5 symmet-
ric ties should have the same social standing, and the model 
based approach explicitly reflects this belief (by giving higher 
status to the person with 5 symmetric ties). Second, the model 
based approach estimates status scores net of total volume 
and reciprocity rates across networks. Thus, the status mea-
sures are conditioned on the specific network context. Finally, 
the model based approach offers a continuous measure of sta-
tus, which is more highly differentiated than the simple count 
measure (where many people across and within contexts 
would have the same status, despite having different profiles 
of indegree and outdegree).
4.2. Independent variables
Our main individual level control variables capture sig-
nals of attractiveness, or high status, in adolescence. They in-
clude GPA, athletic participation, and substance use (Suitor et 
al., 2001).17 We use drinking behavior to measure substance use, 
where drinking equals 1 if the student has had a drink in the last 
3 months and 0 otherwise. We measure GPA, athletic participa-
tion and drinking at different waves to see if changes in “qual-
ity”, or signals of high status, correspond to changes in status.18 
We also include a control variable that measures how impor-
tant popularity is to each student. People who value popular-
ity, will, following a strategic actor model, do things to gain sta-
tus. Importance of popularity ranges from 0 to 3, where 0 equals 
15. The response rate was 88.4%, 81.3%, 80.9%, 79.1% and 76.0% for the first five waves of the study.
16. We exclude the two smallest schools (around 10 people with full data) and one school where a box of surveys was lost in the second wave. The 
school had approximately 35% of the surveys lost and 50% missing data overall.
17. GPA ranges from 1 to 4 where 4 indicates academic success. Athletic participation is an indicator variable, 1 for participates in sports and 0 for 
no participation.
18. We measure change in sports participation as a four category factor: “no change-never in sports”, “joined sports”, “dropped sports”, “no change-
always in sports”. We use “no change-never in sports” as the comparison group. We have a parallel four category variable for drinking.
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not at all important and 3 equals very important, and should be 
positively correlated with changes in status.
We also include a control variable for the number of extra-
curricular activities (excluding sports) in each wave. Finally, 
we include the number of reciprocated nominations as a con-
trol variable. Individuals with many symmetric ties are so-
cially active, making it more likely that individuals outside 
their social circle will nominate them in the future. The results 
are very similar when the number of reciprocated nominations 
is not included in the model.
At the network level, we measure the reciprocity rate as the 
fraction of non-null dyads (so at least one tie exists between i 
and j) which are symmetric (so i nominates j and j nominates 
i). We take the average over the three time points as the mea-
sure of real interest. Tie stability is measured as the proportion 
of nominations, either symmetric or asymmetric, that exist at 
time T that still exist at time T + 1. 19 We take the average over 
the 3 waves as the measure of interest.
5. Models
We begin the analysis with simple descriptive tables of sta-
tus mobility over time. This shows how much movement there 
is from period to period and how much past position mat-
ters for current transitions. We then tease out the underlying 
mechanisms underlying these status movements. We predict 
the gain and loss of ties at the dyadic level. The models predict 
the gain and loss of ties conditioned on whether the tie is recip-
rocated or not. The question is whether an individual can gain 
and maintain ties even though they do not reciprocate. We cre-
ate a dyadic level dataset and use two multilevel logistic regres-
sion models. The first models the probability of a tie remain-
ing at wave 3; the second models the probability of a new tie 
forming at wave 3 (the dependent variable equals 1 if a new 
tie forms and 0 otherwise). The cases in the first regression are 
pairs of adolescents with a tie in period 2. The cases in the sec-
ond regression are pairs of adolescents without a tie in period 2.
These models have the same basic form as the newly devel-
oped STERGMs (Krivitsky and Handcock, 2013), the dynamic 
extension of traditional ERG models. STERGMs produce sepa-
rate estimates for the formation and dissolution of ties, as does 
our model. This is analogous to comparing the pseudo-max-
imum likelihood estimates produced from dyadic indepen-
dent cross sectional models to ERGM MLE estimates. We opt 
for the dynamic dyadic independent models as our theory is 
not contingent on higher order dependencies, such as transi-
tivity or other triadic terms, and the coefficients should be es-
timated sufficiently with these simpler models. Additionally, 
the dyadic independent models make it easier to summarize 
the coefficients over multiple networks, as the coefficients can 
19. The results are quite similar if we define stability by the maintenance of only asymmetric ties. The asymmetric only measure is, however, more 
definitionally tied to the dependent variable and thus a less ideal choice.
Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variable Min Max Mean SD N
Adolescent data: cross section
Status Time 1 −4.909   2.705 −.334 1.221 3834
Status Time 2 −4.437   3.142 −.367 1.173 3834
Status Time 3 −4.682   2.663 −.418 1.162 3834
Status T1–T3 −4.909   3.142 −.373 1.186 3834
Asymmetric Nominations Time 1     .000 11.000 1.580 1.692 3834
Asymmetric Nominations Time 2     .000 14.000 1.601 1.752 3834
Asymmetric Nominations Time 3     .000 15.000 1.527 1.699 3834
Asymmetric Nominations T1–T3     .000 15.000 1.569 1.715 3834
GPA T1   1.000   4.000 2.910   .795 3834
Sports Participation T1     .000   1.000   .622   .485 3834
Black     .000   1.000    .348   .476 3834
Hispanic     .000   1.000   .040   .195 3834
Other     .000   1.000   .062   .242 3834
White     .000   1.000   .550   .497 3834
Male     .000   1.000   .478   .500 3834
Importance of Popularity T1     .000   3.000 1.784 1.022 3834
Drinking Behavior T1     .000   1.000   .127   .333 3834
Number of club affiliations T1     .000   5.000 1.278 1.324 3834
Adolescent data: longitudinal variables
Number of Ties Lost T2–T3      .000 9.000 1.420 1.409 3834
Number of Ties Added T2–T3      .000 9.000 1.446 1.441 3834
Number of Ties Net T2–T3 −8.000 9.000 −.026 1.795 3834
Status Change T2 to T3 −4.506 4.183 −.033 1.198 3834
Status Change T1 to T2 −4.386 4.978 −.051 1.082 3834
GPA Change T2 to T3 −3.000 3.000 −.028   .661 3834
Never in sports T2–T3 −1.000 1.000 −.085   .435 3834
Joined Sports T2–T3      .000 1.000   .288   .453 3834
Dropped Sports T2–T3      .000 1.000   .056   .230 3834
Always in sports T2–T3      .000 1.000   .141   .348 3834
Importance of Popularity T2      .000 1.000   .515   .500 3834
Number of Affiliation Change 2–3      .000 3.000 1.668 1.057 3834
Never Drinking T2–T3 −5.000 5.000 −.135 1.225 3834
Start Drinking T2–T3     .000 1.000   .716   .451 3834
Stop Drinking T2–T3     .000 1.000   .099   .298 3834
Always Drinking T2–T3     .000 1.000   .068   .251 3834
Symmetric Ties T2     .000 1.000   .118   .322 3834
Adolescent data: multilevel variables
Log of Size 4.159 6.236 5.438   .557     24
Tie Stability   .306   .578   .409   .056     24
Reciprocity   .249   .379   .296   .042     24
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be estimated using all networks at once (as opposed to esti-
mating separate models for each and then summarizing the 
coefficients afterwards).
For the first set of regressions, we model the probability 
of a tie remaining at wave 3 as a function of tie presence in 
time 1 and receiver status in time 1 and time 2 (i.e. the status 
of the person being nominated). A tie is present if it is asym-
metric in time 1 and not present otherwise.20 Individuals with 
an asymmetric tie in time 1 should be more likely to main-
tain a tie currently, given whether they currently reciprocate 
or not—as there was asymmetry originally in the relationship. 
We also include controls for homophily effects (race, gender, 
and GPA), sender status in time 2 and outdegree of sender in 
time 2. Formally:
We offer a parallel model for the second set of dyadic re-
gressions, where we model the probability of a new tie form-
ing. The key independent variables are time 1 status and time 
2 status for person k, the second person in each dyad, or the 
potential receiver of the tie in time 3. Here we test if individu-
als with higher status in time 1 are more likely to receive new 
nominations between time 2 and time 3, given the existence/
non-existence of a reciprocated tie. We include the same con-
trols as above.
Significance test are likely to be generous in dyadic inde-
pendent models and we perform a permutation test, the Qua-
dratic Assignment Procedure (QAP), to test the significance 
levels of the coefficients (Krackhardt, 1987). QAP compares 
the observed coefficients to the coefficients found under simu-
lated datasets, where we randomly permute the rows and col-
umns of each network. We test whether a coefficient is larger 
(for positive values) or smaller (for negative values) than co-
efficients found under random datasets with the same type of 
dependence structure. We allow the intercept to vary, making 
the model a fixed effects multilevel logistic QAP regression 
(see also Martin, 2005).
We then move from the dyadic level to the node level, look-
ing at the aggregation of these dyadic mechanisms. We ask 
how individual level status changes from period to period and 
how this varies across contexts. We model the change in status 
from period 2 to period 3 as a function of status change from 
period 1 to period 2. We include second period status, change 
in GPA, drinking behavior, number of club affiliations and 
athletic participation in subsequent models. We also include 
controls for the importance of popularity and the number of 
reciprocated ties in time 2. Fixed demographic characteristics 
(race, gender) are not included as no change is possible. We 
use a linear mixed model as the dependent variable, change 
in status, is approximately normal and the data have a nested 
structure. Our final model examines the relative strength of 
past status transitions on current transitions. We again pre-
dict status change from time 2 to time 3 as a function of status 
change from time 1 to time 2, second period status, and the in-
dividual level controls. Here, the coefficient on status change 
from period 1 to period 2 is allowed to vary across networks. 
At the second level (networks), we model the effect of past 
transitions as a function of reciprocity and tie stability. For-
mally, the model may be written as:
where j corresponds to the network.
6. Results
Table 1 presents a snapshot of our key variables. We be-
gin by examining the distribution of status in the cross section. 
The mean number of asymmetric nomination varies from 1.6 
in time 1 to 1.527 in time 2. Many children have no asymmetric 
nominations, ranging from 28% to 30% over the three waves. 
Around 15% of the students (this also varies by wave) receive 
over 4 asymmetric nominations. The average top person re-
ceives approximately 9 nominations but this varies greatly by 
context. In some schools the maximum asymmetric indegree is 
as high as 15 while in others it is as low as 5. In short, students 
unequally receive nominations from their fellow students.
The next question is how strongly the status system is repro-
duced from period to period. We summarize the level of period 
to period movement in Table 2. The mobility tables measure the 
proportion of students moving from one status category to an-
other over time. Status is measured in relative terms, captur-
ing the proportion of status inferiors for each student. The sta-
tus categories range from low to high, defined by intervals of .2.
Individuals make significant period to period shifts in Ta-
ble 2. For example, approximately 15% of low status students 
in time 2 are middle/high status or higher in time 3, while 
30% are middle status or higher. Similarly, about 30% of the 
high status students in time 2 are middle status or lower in 
time 3. And, more generally, low and high status individuals 
have about a 50% chance of remaining in their current status 
quintile from one period to next. This suggests that individ-
uals have a good chance of being in different status position 
over time, although they do not move randomly across the 
status hierarchy (confirmed using a simple Chi-square test).
Table 3 offers a more nuanced look at the status movement 
across the three time periods. Like in Table 2, the table captures 
the probability of moving between status quintiles. Here, how-
ever, the transition probabilities between time 2 and time 3 are 
conditioned on the time 1 status of the adolescent. Thus, we 
ask where individuals move between time 2 and time 3 given 
where they started in time 1. If the time 1 position did not mat-
ter at all for current transitions, then the sub tables in Table 3 
would all be identical and would simply replicate Table 2.
20. The results are quite similar if you define presence by asymmetric and symmetric ties.
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Table 2. Distribution of future status category by current status category.
                                        Wave 2 status
  Low status Low/Middle Middle Middle/High High status Total
Wave 1 status Low status 44.9% 25.3% 15.3% 10.6% 3.9% 100.0%
 Low/Middle 24.9% 24.9% 25.5% 16.7% 7.9% 100.0%
 Middle 19.3% 22.4% 22.8% 21.9% 13.8% 100.0%
 Middle/High 9.2% 16.9% 21.2% 27.4% 25.3% 100.0%
 High status 2.5% 10.2% 14.3% 23.4% 49.6% 100.0%
  
                                                                         Wave 3 status
  Low status Low/Middle Middle Middle/High      High status  Total
Wave 2 status Low status 47.0% 27.5% 14.7% 8.5% 2.4% 100.0%
 Low/Middle 25.7% 29.3% 23.9% 14.7% 6.4% 100.0%
 Middle 17.8% 21.2% 25.3% 23.0% 12.8% 100.0%
 Middle/High 7.3% 15.8% 22.7% 29.9% 24.3% 100.0%
 High status 2.5% 6.2% 12.8% 23.7% 54.8% 100.0%
Low status, status in lowest 20th percentile in network; Low/Middle, status between 20 and 40 percentiles in network; Middle, status between 40 
and 60 percentiles in network; Middle/High, status between 60 and 80 percentiles in network; High Status, status in top 20th percentile in network.
Table 3. Distribution of time 3 status category by time 1 and time 2 status category.
      Wave 3 status
Low status in time 1  Low status   Low/Middle    Middle Middle/High     High status % of total
Wave 2 status Low status 56.7%    25.8%     9.6%   5.7%   2.3% 9.0%
 Low/Middle 42.3%    29.4%   15.5% 11.9%   1.0% 5.0%
 Middle 37.6%    30.9%   20.8%   8.7%   2.0% 3.8%
 Middle/High 37.5%    26.4%   20.8% 12.5%   2.8% 1.8%
 High status 30.0%    15.0%   25.0% 10.0% 20.0%   .5%
                                        Wave 3 status
Low/Middle status in time 1                                Low status Low/Middle Middle       Middle/High    High status % of total
Wave 2 status Low status 35.2% 32.7% 18.6%   9.5% 4.0% 5.1%
 Low/Middle 30.4% 27.3% 24.2% 13.4% 4.6%  5.0%
 Middle 21.3% 33.9% 24.7% 14.4% 5.7%  4.4%
 Middle/High 15.2% 30.3% 26.5% 20.5% 7.6%  3.4%
 High status 18.5% 13.6% 29.6% 22.2% 16.0%  2.1%
                                        Wave 3 status
Middle status in time 1  Low status Low/Middle Middle Middle/High High status % of total
Wave 2 status Low status 26.4% 26.4% 28.1% 13.2%   5.8% 3.1.%
 Low/Middle 18.2% 27.8% 22.7% 22.7%   8.6% 5.1.%
 Middle 10.3% 13.3% 28.5% 30.9% 17.0% 4.5%
 Middle/High   9.2% 16.9% 21.2% 27.4% 25.3% 4.2%
 High status 14.0% 13.2% 21.1% 28.1% 23.7% 2.9%
                                        Wave 3 status
Middle/High status in time 1  Low status Low/Middle Middle Middle/High High status % of total
Wave 2 status Low status 8.3% 21.4% 26.2% 26.2% 17.9% 2.1%
 Low/Middle 8.5%  13.8% 27.7% 28.5% 21.5%  3.3%
 Middle 10.1% 14.9% 27.4% 29.2% 18.5%  4.3%
 Middle/High 6.2%  15.7% 19.5% 33.8% 24.8%  5.4%
 High status 4.8%  15.6% 17.2% 29.0% 33.3%  4.8%
                                        Wave 3 status
High status in time 1  Low status Low/Middle Middle Middle/High High status % of total
Wave 2 status Low status 6.5% 9.7% 29.0% 16.1% 38.7%     .8%
 Low/Middle 6.5% 11.3% 17.7% 33.9% 30.6%   1.6%
 Middle 1.9% 11.2% 19.6% 28.0% 39.3%   2.7%
 Middle/High 3.5% 7.6% 15.7% 26.3% 47.0%   5.1%
 High status 1.3% 3.0% 7.6% 20.0% 68.1% 10.1%
Low status, status in lowest 20th percentile in network; Low/Middle, status between 20 and 40 percentiles in network; Middle, status between 40 
and 60 percentiles in network; Middle/High, status between 60 and 80 percentiles in network; High Status, status in top 20th percentile in network.
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It is clear that initial status matters for current transitions. 
For example, we can look at individuals who started at the 
bottom of the status hierarchy in time 1 (the top panel in Table 
3). They are, across the board, most likely to be in the lowest 
status quintile in time 3, despite the time 2 position. Even the 
middle/high and high status individuals are most likely to fall 
back to their original position. This represents an unlikely tra-
jectory (only 2% of the total population), but it is still the case 
that when low status people rise to the top, they have a good 
chance of falling back to the bottom.
More generally, those with lower starting status position 
in time 1 occupy lower status positions in time 3, given sta-
tus in time 2. For example, the probability of remaining in the 
lowest quintile between time 2 and time 3 goes from .57 to .35 
to .26 to .8 to .065 as time 1 status moves from low to high. 
Or, from the top of the distribution, those in the top quintile 
in time 1 and time 2 have an almost 90% chance of being in the 
top two quintiles in time 3, while that number is only 30% for 
a strongly upwardly mobile person. This is not to say that time 
2 status is unimportant. Those with higher status in time 2 are 
the least likely to be in the low status position in time 3, given 
time 1 location. The overall picture, however, is still one where 
those in the bottom spot in time 1 are likely to be in the bottom 
or adjacent status position in time 3, even if they occupy a high 
status position in time 2.
Taken together, Table 2 and Table 3 offer a mixed picture of 
the status system: there is considerable movement from period 
to period but individuals are likely to move back to their orig-
inal status position after a move up the hierarchy. Much of the 
period to period movement is thus individuals losing gained 
status or returning to a lost position of the past.
6.1. Underlying mechanisms
We have so far established that there is movement from pe-
riod to period but little lasting mobility. We now ask why sta-
tus gains are possible but often met with moves back down 
the hierarchy, confirming our underlying propositions: first, 
expectations of reciprocity depend on current status; second, 
new ties are less stable than old ties; and third, expectations 
of reciprocity are dependent on previous status, given current 
status. The results of the dyadic logistic regression are pre-
sented in Table 4. The first set of regressions predicts which 
ties remain from period 2 to period 3. The second set of regres-
sions predicts the formation of new nominations.
We first explain why mobility is possible, focusing on the 
time 2 status effects in Model 2 and Model 5 of Table 4. Indi-
viduals with higher status in time 2 are more likely to retain 
an existing tie, net of reciprocating, but the effect is not over-
whelming. For example, in Model 2, the probability of keep-
ing a tie is .38 for someone with 1.5 status in time 2 and .44 
for someone with a status value of 4 (an increase of 2 standard 
deviations in status, assuming both have 0 status in time 1). 
Higher status actors are thus only somewhat advantaged in 
keeping ties, leading to a large absolute loss of nominations. 
Individuals with higher status are also more likely to gain ties 
over time, but this advantage is not enough to outweigh the 
loss of asymmetric nominations.
We examine the drag of the past propositions in Model 3 
and Model 6. Beginning with tie stability in Model 3, a tie is 
more likely to remain from time 2 to time 3, given current rec-
iprocity, if that tie existed and was asymmetric in time 1.21,22 
A tie that was asymmetric in time 1 is 1.69 times more likely 
to remain (given current reciprocity) than a tie that was not 
asymmetric in time 1. Upwardly mobile individuals differen-
tially rely on new ties for their status and thus have a difficult 
time retaining their newly found position.
Initial status also plays an important role in structuring the 
stability of ties. A tie is more likely to remain if the receiver of 
the tie has higher status in time 1. A tie is about 1.9 times more 
likely to remain when the receiver is of high status in time 1 
(moving from status of 0, the mean, to a status of 4, the maxi-
mum). The demands for reciprocity are higher for people with 
lower initial status and maintaining asymmetric nominations, 
and thus status, is more difficult. The effect is similar for tie 
gain: individuals are more likely to offer a new nomination to 
21. The results are similar if we include symmetric ties in our measure of time 1 tie existence.
22. The results are given current reciprocity. This implies two possibilities. In both cases, person A likes person B in time 1, but person B does not 
return the sentiment. In the first case, person B may start to like person A by time 3, creating a reciprocated tie. In the second case, person B does 
not create a reciprocated tie in time 3, despite the initial liking from person A in time 1. In both cases the initial asymmetric tie is more likely to 
stay than a tie that did not exist in time 1.
Table 4. Multilevel logistic dyadic regression with QAP adjustment: tie kept and gained from time 2 to time 3.
Variables Tie Kept T2-T3a                                                                             Tie Gained T2-T3b,c 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept −0.601*** −0.705*** −1.291*** −5.031*** −5.781*** −7.446***
Tieji Exists in Time 3   1.881***   1.926***   1.889***   4.708***   4.987***   4.453***
Asymmetric Time 1     .640***      .523***   3.166***    2.454***
Time 2 Status of Receiver      .116***     .136***      .479***     .477***
Time 1 Status of Receiver      .127***     .078***      .16***     .078***
Time 2 Status of Sender   −.051**   −.031   −.205***  −.194***
Match Race        .235***      .867***
Match Sex        .556***    1.258***
GPA Difference     −.093    −.236***
Out-degree of Sender     −.044      .109***
N (Dyads) 10,465 10,465 10,465 724,162 724,162 724,162
Deviance 12,508.938 12,532.240 12,344.779 75,256.573 75,390.044 68,909.971
AIC 12,558.938 12,586.240 12,408.779 75,262.573 75,400.044 68,929.971
BIC 12,740.333 12,782.150 12,640.964 75,297.051 75,457.508 69,044.898
p-values are calculated using non-parametric, permutations tests. We randomly permute the rows and columns of each network 1000 times, 
randomly attaching the independent variables to the dyads in the school/grade. We then use the randomly permuted data to calculate the 
coefficients in Models 1, 2 and 3 for each iteration. The observed coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level if the observed coefficient 
is larger (for positive coefficients) or smaller (for negative coefficients) than 95% of the randomly generated coefficients.
a. Models only include cases where a tie existed in time 2.
b. Models only include cases where a tie did not exist in time 2.
c. The “receivers” in these models correspond to the second person, j, in each dyad, or the potential receiver of the tie in time 3.
** p < .01 (one tailed test).
*** p < .001 (one tailed test).
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those with higher status in time 1, given reciprocity at time 3. 
Individuals with lower status in time 1 have less time/energy 
to foster new ties, as they face higher expectations of reciproc-
ity, and are thus less likely to receive new nominations. Over-
all, the dyadic logistic models show that the past drags on cur-
rent transitions because new ties are less stable than old ones 
and the expectations of reciprocity are higher for initially low 
status people.
6.2. Multilevel models of status change
We now place the process of status change into particu-
lar contexts, describing how different trajectories of status are 
likely/possible across settings. The key is that the micro mech-
anisms described in Table 4 are amplified or deflated depend-
ing on the larger context in which status gains and losses oc-
cur, leading to larger or greater drags of the past after initial 
status gains (McFarland et al., 2014).
We begin with a simple continuous model of status gain 
and loss. Table 5 presents a linear mixed model predicting sta-
tus change between time 2 and time 3 as a function of previ-
ous status change. Status moves between period 1 and period 
2 are negatively correlated with status moves between period 
2 and period 3. Someone moving up in status is likely to move 
back down. Someone moving down in status is likely to move 
back up. The negative correlation between previous and cur-
rent status change holds even if we control for current status 
and changes in individual characteristics (see Models 2–4). 
Thus, like in Table 3, upward mobility is often fleeting as sta-
tus gains in the previous period are met with status losses in 
the current period (given current status).
Model 4 describes how our micro processes play out in dif-
ferent contexts and how this shapes the potential for sustained 
upward mobility. We allow the coefficient on status change be-
tween time 1 and time 2 to vary across networks, predicting 
the variation as a function of tie stability and reciprocity (at the 
network, or second, level).23 As in Models 1–3, status gains be-
tween time 1 and time 2 are met with status losses between time 
2 and time 3. The strength of this relationship, however, varies 
systematically with the level of tie stability and reciprocity. The 
drag of the past, or the effect of status transitions between T1 
and T2, is lower in schools where ties are more stable. The case 
for reciprocity is reversed. The reciprocity interaction coeffi-
cients in Table 5 are negative, as expected, and significant. Thus, 
23. We ran parallel models where each student was assigned tie stability and reciprocity values purged of individual level effects. We first removed 
a student from the network and then recalculated tie stability and reciprocity on the reduced network, assigning those network level measures 
to the removed student. This procedure was repeated for each student in the network. In these models, the ties, and therefore status trajectory, 
of an individual could not affect their tie stability and reciprocity values. The substantive results for these models are identical to the findings 
presented here.
Table 5. HLM for change in status time 2 to time 3. 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept −.066 −.182*** −.423*** −.448
  (.037)  (.034)  (.053)  (.295)
Status Change T1–T2 −.355*** −.198*** −.184*** −.199
  (.013)  (.014)  (.018)  (.132)
Status T2  −.337*** −.412*** −.411***
   (.014)  (.017)  (.012)
GPA Change T2–T3     .004   .003
    (.023)  (.023)
Join Sports T2–T3   −.020 −.021
    (.069)  (.069)
Drop Sports T2–T3   −.011 −.012
    (.048)  (.048)
Always in Sports T1–T3     .052   .052
   (.036)  (.036)
Importance of Popularity T2    .013   .014
   (.014)  (.014)
Number of Affiliations Change T2–T3    .015   .015
   (.012)  (.012)
Start Drinking T2–T3    .084   .079
   (.051)  (.051)
Stop Drinking T2–T3    .062   .066
   (.060)  (.060)
Stay Drinking T2–T3    .040   .042
   (.047) (.047)
Reciprocated Ties T2    .116***  .116***
   (.015) (.015)
Tie Stability     .337
    (.793)
Status Change × Tie Stability     .917**
    (.319)
Reciprocity                                  −.389
                                 (1.019)
Status Change × Reciprocity                                −1.201**
    (.414)
Number of Networks 24 24 24 24
N 3834 3855 3834 3834
Deviance 10,787.995 10,282.742 10,214.726 10,202.689
AIC 10,795.995 10,292.742 10,244.726 10,244.689
BIC 10,821.002 10,324.001 10,338.5 10,375.974
Standard errors in parentheses.
** p < .01 (two tailed test) ; *** p < .001 (two tailed test)


















schools with higher reciprocity have stronger effects of the past, 
as the expectations of reciprocity are stronger.24
We present a stylized set of results for tie stability and reci-
procity in Figure 1. The lines represent the effect of past status 
transitions on current status change in different contexts. We of-
fer four possible settings. The first line represents a low tie sta-
bility, high reciprocity network; the second represents a high tie 
stability, high reciprocity network; the third is a low tie stabil-
ity, low reciprocity network; and the last line represents a high 
tie stability, low reciprocity network.25 The extreme cases occur 
when tie stability and reciprocity differ, as they affect the drag 
of the past in the opposite manner. When reciprocity is high 
and tie stability is low then the effect of the past is quite strong, 
while it is almost non-existent in a system with low reciproc-
ity and high tie stability. A status move of 2 is met with an ex-
pected status loss of 1.2 in the low reciprocity, high tie stabil-
ity setting, but only a loss of .08 in the high reciprocity, low tie 
stability network. The effect of the past is somewhere between 
these two extremes in networks with similar reciprocity/tie sta-
bility values (which is the most likely case as reciprocity and tie 
stability tend to be positively correlated).
Or consider two hypothetical cases: person A goes from 
1.5 status to 2 between time 1 and time 2 while person B goes 
from 2.5 to 2.26 They both have the same status in time 2, but 
one is upwardly mobile while the other has recently lost sta-
tus. The difference in expected status between the two cases in 
time 3 is .57 in the high reciprocity, low tie stability setting but 
only .04 in the low reciprocity, high tie stability setting. Thus 
in one setting, the difference almost returns to the original 
status difference (1), despite having the same status at time 2 
(2), while in another setting the status differences would be al-
most non-existent in time 3, despite having different staring 
points in time 1 (2.5 versus 1.5).
In short, mobile students are dragged back toward their ini-
tial positions in the low tie stability, high reciprocity setting, 
thus reproducing the rank order present at time 1. The past 
plays a much less discernible role in the high tie stability set-
ting. The upwardly mobile rely on new, unstable ties and have 
higher expectations of reciprocity. They thus have a better 
chance of retaining their status when new ties are less unstable 
relative to old ties and the expectations of reciprocity are low.27
7. Testing network hypotheses in the face of measurement 
error
Overall, the results are encouraging: our propositions about 
status change are supported, as are our contextual level hypoth-
eses. Thus far, we have tested our hypotheses while bypassing 
all questions of data quality: we have assumed that adolescents 
offer and rescind ties in a systematic manner and that our mea-
sure of status change is valid. This follows the majority of net-
work studies. It is possible, however, that these assumptions are 
rather generous. The data may be prone to the whims of adoles-
cents, simple errors in reporting, and other unsystematic, ran-
dom tendencies in the reporting of friendships (as well as in-
complete coverage of the network – Smith and Moody, 2013).
It is important to see if our results, which assume the nom-
inations are real, could have resulted from measurement error 
in the data. We would not expect all of the data to be false, 
of course, but our results could be compromised even if parts 
of the data are error filled. For example, we can safely as-
sume that reciprocated relationships are real—as two people 
acknowledge the existence of the social tie (for example, i is 
about 100 times more likely to form a new tie with j if j already 
nominates i). Asymmetric ties are more uncertain. Individuals 
may write down the names of their real, reciprocated friends 
and then anyone else they can remember on the spot (perhaps 
people they saw in the hall or in class). Similarly, people may 
circle the wrong name by mistake. It would not be surprising 
that such nominations are not reciprocated, as the other per-
son is unlikely to make the same mistake. If this is true, then 
asymmetries do not represent differences in status, as we have 
assumed, but rather mistakes in the data. We would be unable 
to differentiate between true changes and changes due to ran-
dom error, casting some doubt on the initial results.
Figure 1. Change in status between time 2 and 3 by tie stability and 
reciprocity.
Table 6. Multilevel logistic dyadic regression, comparing measure-
ment error coefficients to observed coefficients: tie gained from time 




Asymmetric Time 1 (.092, .450) 2.249
Time 2 Status of Receiver (−.026, .034)   .316
Time 1 Status of Receiver (−.028, .026)   .098
Time 2 Status of Sender (−.378, −.355) −.089
Match Race (−.048, .034) 1.017
Match Sex (−.055, .040) 1.218
GPA Difference (−.086, .112) −.229
Out-degree of Sender (.359, .377)   .047
24. We would, however, hesitate to push this finding too far as the range of reciprocity across schools is limited, (.249–.379), meaning the inference 
is restricted to a small part of the entire range of possible reciprocity values.
25. We define “low” and “high” by the extreme values found in the data (technically a bit above or below the extreme values). Both reciprocity and 
tie stability are on the same scale, and we thus use the same low and high values for both tie stability and reciprocity. This ensures that the ef-
fects do not seem larger just because the empirical ranges were wider for tie stability. We use .25 as the low value and .5 for the high value for 
both reciprocity and tie stability.
26. Assume they both started to drink, were always in sports, had two symmetric ties and valued popularity.
27. We may be concerned that this analysis is misleading if no status gains are possible in stable settings. We suggest that such concerns are mis-
placed as initial status moves are possible in our high tie stability settings.
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Given these concerns, we have included an additional anal-
ysis checking the validity of the results.28 The test is based on 
a simple question: could we have found the same results if all 
changes in the nominations were due to measurement error? 
We begin by generating networks consistent with this null hy-
pothesis. The networks are constant except for changes due 
to measurement error. We begin with the observed networks 
in time 1. The reciprocated ties are treated as real. The asym-
metric nominations are treated as random guesses on the part 
of the respondent. The reciprocated ties are held constant: re-
ciprocated ties present in time 1 are still present in time 2 and 
time 3 (so no “real” change occurs). The asymmetric nomina-
tions in time 1 are randomly reassigned to other people in the 
network. Thus, if person 1 sent out 3 asymmetric ties in time 
1, then we randomly select 3 people in the network and assign 
nominations from person 1 to those randomly selected people. 
We do this for every person in the network who sent asym-
metric ties in time 1. These generated networks are then used 
to calculate the status scores. This process is repeated three 
times to mirror the three waves of empirical data (so three net-
works are generated, all starting from the time 1 network). 
Any changes in status are due to measurement error.
We then rerun the original analysis, using the measurement 
error status scores instead of the observed data. The models are 
specified as before, except for some small changes to the dy-
adic models. Here, we only consider changes in the asymmetric 
ties, as, by definition, no reciprocated ties are lost or gained over 
time. Similarly, we only present the results for gaining ties. Few 
asymmetric ties are kept from period to period in the measure-
ment error data, making it impossible to properly estimate the 
model for keeping ties.29 For example, in the empirical data 8% 
of the asymmetric ties last over the 3 periods, while only .05% 
last in the random error data. We repeat the entire process 100 
times to capture variation in the measurement error results.
8. Measurement error results
The results, on the whole, are encouraging: the key find-
ings in the paper cannot be generated by measurement error 
alone. Table 6 presents the dyadic model results. The table in-
cludes the measurement error results as well as the estimates 
for the observed data. It is clear that the presence of a tie in 
time 1 has a much stronger effect in the observed data than in 
the measurement error data. Similarly, the status effects are es-
sentially non-existent in the measurement error model but are 
strong and positive in the observed data.
The contextual level results tell a similar story, where it is 
once again clear that the observed results could not have been 
generated by random measurement error. Table 7 presents the 
multilevel models. Model 1 presents the unconditioned model, 
predicting status change between time 2 and time 3 as a func-
tion of status change between time 1 and time 2. The first col-
umn presents the measurement error results. Those who re-
ceived new asymmetric ties between time 1 and time 2, and 
thus gained status, are unlikely to get lucky again and receive 
asymmetric ties in time 3. Thus, by measurement error alone, 
those who gain status between time 1 and time 2 tend to lose 
status between time 2 and time 3. It is clear that the observed 
coefficient is larger (or absolutely smaller) than that generated 
by measurement error. This means that individuals who move 
up between time 1 and time 2 move down between time 2 and 
time 3, but at a slower rate than that expected by measurement 
error alone. Some of the gained ties are real and are thus kept 
period to period (unlike in the measurement error data).
Model 3 presents the full model. The key coefficients are 
the school-level predictors: the interaction between status 
change and tie stability and the interaction between status 
change and reciprocity. The 95% confidence interval for the in-
teraction between tie stability and status change is (−.716, .527) 
in the measurement error model, while the observed value is 
.917. Similarly, the confidence interval for the interaction be-
tween reciprocity and status change is (−1.079, .971), while the 
true value is −1.201. The empirical values are thus well outside 
the range expected under random measurement error.
It is important to note that the status change coefficient is 
less robust to measurement error in Model 3. The coefficient 
captures the baseline effect of previous status change on cur-
rent status change for a network with low tie stability and low 
reciprocity. Here, the empirical value falls within the range 
produced by the random measurement error process. The em-
pirical value is −.199, while the 95% CI is (−.502, .053,). This 
means that in some networks measurement error can generate 
the basic negative correlation between movement in one pe-
riod and movement in the next; this cannot be the case in most 
networks, however, as the overall correlation cannot be gener-
ated by measurement error alone (see Model 1).
28. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
29. The data are based on the random assignment of asymmetric ties, and it is unlikely to see a person nominated by the same person twice in a row. 
The estimates are very unstable given the small number of ties kept from period to period.
Table 7. HLM for change in status time 2 to time 3, comparing measurement error coefficients to observed coefficients.
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3
Variables 95% CI:  Observed 95% CI:  Observed 95% CI:  Observed
 measurement    coefficient measurement  coefficient  measurement       coefficient
 error coefficients  error coefficients  error coefficients   
Intercept (−.001, .001) −.066 (−.015, .146) −.182 (−.015, .146) −.448
Status Change T1–T2 (−.531, −.473) −.355 (−.300, −.227) −.198 (−.502, .053) −.199
Status T2   (−.528, −.445) −.337 (−.556, −.474) −.411
GPA Change T2–T3     (−.042, .045)   .003
Join Sports T2–T3     (−.104, .161) −.021
Drop Sports T2–T3     (−.074, .106) −.012
Always in Sports T1–T3     (−.043, .052)   .052
Importance of Popularity T2     (−.029, .010)   .014
Number of Affiliations Change T2–T3     (−.020, .018)   .015
Start Drinking T2–T3     (−.065, .099)   .079
Stop Drinking T2–T3     (−.069, .127)   .066
Stay Drinking T2–T3     (−.077, .098)   .042
Reciprocated Ties T2     (.068, .101)   .116
Tie Stability     (−.576, −.018)   .337
Status Change × Tie Stability     (−.716, .527)   .917
Reciprocity     (−.552, .121) −.389
Status Change × Reciprocity     (−1.079, .971) −1.201
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We explore these contextual differences more directly in 
Table 8. Table 8 presents the results for 5 example networks, 
running from high to low tie stability. We run separate regres-
sion models for each network. Here, there are no contextual 
interactions and the model predicts status change between 
time 2 and time 3 as a function of status change between time 
1 and time 2 (and the intercept, not reported in the table). It is 
like Model 1 in Table 7, but there are separate results for each 
network. The results mirror those of Table 7. First, the drag of 
the past is stronger in low tie stability settings than in high tie 
stability settings, and this finding is not replicated in the mea-
surement error results. Second, the observed coefficient on 
status change between time 1 and time 2 is outside the mea-
surement error bounds in four out of five cases. It is only in 
the medium-low tie stability network that the observed coef-
ficient is consistent with the measurement error results (with 
an observed coefficient of −.509 and a measurement error con-
fidence interval of (−.584, −.346)). Thus, most of the networks 
have status movement that is inconsistent with measurement 
error. We can then be confident in our basic findings.
Overall, the results are real and robust. The dyadic results 
clearly show that individuals gain ties in a systematic man-
ner: people give ties to high status actors and do not randomly 
pick among the people they see. Measurement error can gen-
erate the negative relationship between status change in one 
period and status change in the next in a few settings, but not 
most. Similarly, our contextual level results could not have 
been generated by measurement error. Thus, our basic find-
ings would be the same even if we ignored the few settings 
that are indistinguishable from measurement error.
Still, we cannot ignore the fact that status change is indis-
tinguishable from measurement error in some settings. This 
does not upset the findings of this paper, but it does offer a 
cautionary tale, and we encourage future work to seriously 
consider the problem of measurement error in dynamic net-
work data.
9. Discussion and conclusion
This paper has examined the stability of status hierarchies by 
building on, and ultimately diverging from, traditional cumu-
lative advantage models. Strict cumulative advantage models 
suggest that inequality increases over time, making status rank-
ings stable and mobility unlikely. We argue, in contrast, that 
status hierarchies exhibit considerable period to period change. 
Higher status people may be socially attractive (Gould, 2002), 
but their attractiveness is overwhelmed by the demand for reci-
procity, leading many unreciprocated ties to disappear and rais-
ing the possibility of upward mobility – as the gap between the 
upper and lower strata decreases. The rosy scenario of reduced 
status inequality, is, however, spoiled by the drag of the past: 
newcomers to the top of the hierarchy often fall farther than 
status peers, while those who had previously lost status are 
buoyed by past reputation. Mobile actors are therefore pulled 
back to their original position and the status system exhibits 
long term stability in the face of period to period movement. 
We thus arrive at the same long term pattern of stratification as 
cumulative advantage theories, where sustained mobility is un-
likely, but from very different paths.
We also diverge from cumulative advantage approaches by 
systematically explaining how, and more importantly, where, 
sustained mobility is possible. We argue that the upwardly 
mobile are more likely to retain their status gains when rela-
tionships are durable and reciprocity is not universally de-
manded. Such settings raise the prospects for lasting mobil-
ity. We found, using data on adolescents that our theory was 
largely supported.
We have so far developed and tested a theory of status mo-
bility that assumes status is important, but it is worth briefly 
considering how status matters. It is clear that status matters 
a great deal when it cannot be distinguished from quality: ca-
reers, scientific and otherwise, are built on status and reputa-
tion. Status is not, however, merely a means to win resources, 
but is an end to itself. The majority of adolescents in our 
study felt that “being popular” was somewhat or very impor-
tant, and status valuation predicts subsequent aggression and 
other risk behaviors ( Faris and Ennett, 2012; Sijtsema et al., 
2009). Park and Burgess (1921, p. 30; quoted in Bothner et al., 
2010a and Bothner et al., 2010b) observed that “men work for 
wages…they will die to preserve their status.”
Given the value that individuals place on status, it is im-
portant to consider the role of individual action in status hier-
archy dynamics. We have so far treated strategic action, where 
actor want status and act to attain it, as a variable to control 
away. Valuing popularity and changing ‘quality’ did not pre-
dict changes in status, nor did they affect our results. Com-
pared to our model, changes in individual characteristics may 
matter more, however, in settings where quality is more eas-
ily distinguished from status. For example, a tennis player’s 
status within her team may largely be a function of her court 
performance. Yet, even here other factors may come into play, 
and we might yet expect past interactions to drag on future 
status changes.
We have dealt less directly with starker strategic action, 
where individuals purposely join or leave settings. It is worth 
noting, first and foremost, that many contexts are difficult or 
costly to enter or exit (e.g. workplaces) and the desire to move 
may be inconsequential. Additionally, actors are unlikely to 
change settings based solely on status considerations, and, 
even if they do, they are likely to make their entrances blindly, 
and to exit only after having failed. The choice to enter or exit 
a setting is therefore unlikely to substantially influence our 
model. Future work could, however, add to the fullness of our 
theory by incorporating self selection into the model.
We also encourage network scholars to address the problem 
of measurement error. Longitudinal network data may be prone 
to misreporting, making it difficult to differentiate true change 
from error. Our simulation offers a simple way to incorporate 
measurement error into an analysis, and we look forward to fu-
ture studies developing more sophisticated approaches.
Our theory also has a number of more specific implications 
for ongoing lines of research. For example, social psycholog-
ical research on task groups (Berger et al., 1974; Berger et al., 
1980;  Gibson, 2003) might consider the interaction between se-
quence, or action order, and context: where initial actions are 
more important for long term outcomes in settings where sta-
tus moves are difficult to maintain. Similarly, status expecta-
tions (Berger et al., 1972) will be more consequential, or harder 
to overcome, in task groups where the network features make 
sustained status movement unlikely.
We also hope that our theory adds to the literature on cu-
mulative advantage processes. DiPrete and Eirich (2006) 
Table 8. OLS for change in status time 2 to time 3: comparing 
measurement error status change coefficients to observed coefficients 
in high to low tie stability contexts.
Tie stability of network 95% CI for status change  Observed
 T1–T2, unconditioned  coefficient
 measurement error model 
High (value = .463) (−.576, −.420) −.202
Medium High (value = .436) (−.616, −.392) −.286
Medium (value = .393) (−.682, −.391) −.344
Medium Low (value = .363) (−.584, −.346) −.509
Low (value = .306) (−.633, −.367) −.682
The values correspond to the coefficient for status change T1–T2. The 
models include an intercept but are unconditioned on any other terms. We 
do not report the intercept in the table. The models are run on 5 example 
networks, running from high to low stability. The models are run separately 
for each network.
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argued that future studies should be more precise in speci-
fying the cumulative advantage mechanisms at work. One 
could, in part, answer that call by describing the maintenance 
of inequality along the lines presented here. For example, 
the literature on cumulative advantage and school tracking 
(Kerckhoff, 1993; Kerckhoff and Glennie, 1999) could distin-
guish between strong cumulative advantage settings and set-
tings where educational gains occur but are hard to maintain, 
perhaps as a result of “summer setbacks” (Entwisle and Alex-
ander, 1992). Of course, we may find that cumulative advan-
tage is overwhelmingly strong in other substantive settings: 
our argument simply points to the possibility of period to pe-
riod movement in ultimately stable status hierarchies. The the-
ory thus challenges, however modestly, the monopoly of cu-
mulative advantage, offering a different answer, or perhaps a 
different question, to the puzzle of enduring inequality.
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